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THE WAR OF ART, NOT THE ART OF WAR:
VON SAHER V NORTON SIMON
MUSEUM OF ART AT PASADENA
AND THE CONTINUING FIGHT TO RETRIEVE
NAZI-LOOTED ART IN CALIFORNIA
Tsolik Kazandjian *
During World War II, the Nazi regime stole and confiscated almost all
of the property of Holocaust victims fleeing their home countries to
avoid persecution. In 2009, the Ninth Circuit held in Von Saher v.
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena that a Calfornia statute
allowing heirs of Nazi-looted art to sue museums and galleries in the
state was unconstitutional because it interfered with the federal
government's foreign affairs powers. This Comment argues that the
Ninth Circuit used the incorrect preemption test in Von Saher and that
the statute at issue neither interferes with nor has more than an
incidental effect on the federal government's foreign affairs powers.
Rather, the statute regulates an area of traditional state responsibility,
which means that it is constitutional.
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., University of
California, Santa Barbara. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review for their hard work on this Comment. A very special thanks to Professor Dan
Schechter for his amazing guidance and support. Most importantly, I would like to thank my
family for their endless love and patience, without which this Comment would not have been
possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
During World War II, the Nazi regime stole and confiscated
most, if not all, of the property of Holocaust victims fleeing their
respective home countries to avoid persecution.' One such wave of
theft began when Nazi troops invaded the Netherlands on May 10,
1940.2 Jacques Goudstikker, a prominent Dutch art dealer, fled from
his home with his family on a ship traveling to South America,
leaving behind his gallery containing about 1,200 works of art,
including Rembrandts and Cranachs.' The Nazis proceeded to loot
Goudstikker's gallery, and thus a particular pair of paintings started
its journey traveling around the world and eventually ended up in a
museum in California.4 When Goudstikker's heir, Marei von Saher,
found out where her family's long-lost paintings were, she decided to
do something.'
Von Saher sued the Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena
(the "Museum") under section 354.3 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure.' Section 354.3 allows any owner of or heir to Holocaust-
era artwork to bring suit against "any museum or gallery that
displays, exhibits, or sells any article of historical, interpretive,
scientific, or artistic significance";' it also extends the statute of
limitations for the claims until December 31, 2010.8 Though von
Saher properly brought suit under section 354.3 by suing a museum
displaying her Holocaust-era artwork before December 31, 2010,
both the lower court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
1. Brief for Bet Tzedek Legal Services et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-
Appellant at 4-5, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578 F.3d 1016 (9th
Cir. 2009) (No. 07-56691).
2. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1021.
3. Brief of Appellant at 7, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578
F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-56691).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See Von Saber v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, No. 08-2866, 2007 WL
4302726 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007).
6. Id
7. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3(a)(1) (West 2006).
8. Id. § 354.3(c). The California legislature enacted the statute because California has a
"moral and public policy interest in assuring that its residents and citizens are given a reasonable
opportunity to commence an action in court" for the stolen artwork currently located in museums
and galleries. Assem. B. 1758, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002). The legislature noted that the
current three-year statute of limitations was an insufficient amount of time to investigate and
commence an action "[d]ue to the unique circumstances surrounding the theft of Holocaust-era
artwork." Id
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Circuit held that section 354.3 was unconstitutional because it
infringed on the federal government's foreign affairs power.'
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that by enacting section 354.3,
California created a "friendly forum for litigating Holocaust
restitution claims""o open to anyone inside or out of the state who
wanted to sue any gallery or museum located anywhere in the
world." The court held that by doing so, California acted outside of
its "traditional state responsibility"l2 and encroached upon the
government's power to make and resolve war.13
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that
the federal government's foreign affairs power preempts section
354.3. Part II introduces the facts and procedural posture of the Von
Saher case. Part III discusses the majority's reasoning and Judge
Harry Pregerson's dissent. Part IV discusses why the Garamendi
field-preemption analysis should not apply,14 why the original
Zschernig test would have been more proper," and why section
354.3 has a merely incidental effect on foreign affairs." Finally, this
Comment concludes that the Ninth Circuit's decision should be
reversed if the case is appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
II. THE FACTS
Marei von Saher is the only living relative of Jacques
Goudstikker," an art dealer who lived in the Netherlands. In 1931, at
an auction in Berlin, Goudstikker bought a diptych comprised of two
9. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir.
2009); Von Saher, 2007 WL 4302726, at *3. The Supreme Court has identified the power to deal
with foreign affairs as almost exclusively federal. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396, 413-14 (2003) (stating that the foreign affairs power was originally given to the federal
government so that the country's dealings with foreign nations would be uniform).
10. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1026.
11. Id.
12. The regulation of property is a traditional state responsibility. Id at 1025. For examples
of other traditional state responsibilities, see Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 425-26 (regulating
insurance business and "blue sky" laws); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968)
(regulating the descent and distribution of estates); and Deutsch v. Turner, 324 F.3d 692, 707
(2003) (establishing state procedural rules where such regulation does not impair effective
exercise of the nation's foreign policy).
13. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1027.
14. See infra Part IV.A.
15. See infra Part IV.B.l.
16. See infra Part IV.B.2.
17. Brief of Appellant at 2, Von Saher, 578 F.3d 1016 (No. 07-56691).
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paintings-"Adam" and "Eve" (collectively "the Cranachs")-
painted by Lucas Cranach the Elder in the sixteenth century." When
Goudstikker fled the Netherlands after the Nazi invasion, he left
behind his assets, including the Cranachs.19 After the Nazis looted
Goudstikker's collection, they hid the artwork in the German
countryside 20 until the Allied forces discovered the pieces and
returned them to the Netherlands.2 1 Once identified, the Cranachs
were delivered to another claimant, Georges Stroganoff-Scherbatoff
("Stroganoff'). 2 2 Stroganoff sold the paintings through an art dealer
to the Museum in 1971.23
In 2007, von Saher filed suit against the Museum under section
354.3, seeking the return of the Cranachs that were allegedly stolen
from the Goudstikkers during World War II by the Nazis. 24 The
Museum then brought a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. 25 The lower court granted the
Museum's motion and held that the statute was unconstitutional
because it violated the foreign affairs doctrine26 as interpreted by the
Ninth Circuit in Deutsch v. Turner Corp.27 The district court
reasoned that the California statute "intrude[d] on the federal
government's exclusive power to make and resolve war, including
the procedure for resolving war claims" by seeking to "redress
wrongs committed in the course of the Second World War." 28 The
court then dismissed von Saher's complaint with prejudice because it
18. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1020.
19. Id. at 1021.
20. The Cranachs, along with many other works, were hidden at Carinhall, the country estate
of Herman Goring, Reischsmarschall of the Third Reich. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Though Stroganoff claimed that the Cranachs belonged to his family, the paintings
actually came from the Church of the Holy Trinity in Kiev. Brief of Appellant at 7, Von Saher,
578 F.3d 1016 (No. 07-56691).
23. Id
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 417-25 (2003) (discussing conflict
preemption where the foreign affairs doctrine invalidates a state law because it conflicts with
express federal foreign policy); Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1968) (discussing
field preemption where the doctrine invalidates a state law that promotes hostility or criticism
toward a foreign government).
27. 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena,
2007 WL 4302726, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007).
28. Von Sahar, 2007 WL 4302726, at *3 (citing Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 712).
Summer 2010]1 1481
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.43:1477
had not been filed within California's three-year statute of limitations
period.2 9 Von Saher appealed.
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING
In Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum ofArt at Pasadena,3 0 the
majority held that section 354.3 was barred by field preemption'
because it intruded on the federal government's exclusive foreign
affairs power. 32 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the statute went
outside the scope of California's "traditional state responsibility" and
was therefore subject to field-preemption analysis. 33 The court
applied the American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi34 test to see
whether the statute infringed on any express or implied government
powers. 5 Garamendi states that field preemption is the appropriate
doctrine to consider if a state took a position on a matter of foreign
policy "with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state
responsibility." 36
A. Section 354.3 Goes Beyond the Scope of
Traditional State Responsibility
In order to resolve whether the foreign affairs doctrine
preempted section 354.3, the court first asked whether the statute
addressed a traditional state responsibility. Though the court stated
that property is a traditional area of state regulation, it reasoned that
29. Id. The Ninth Circuit, while affirming that section 354.3 is unconstitutional, reversed the
lower court's ruling that Von Saher's claim be dismissed with prejudice because it was not
apparent from her complaint whether it had been properly filed within California's regular three-
year statute of limitations as set forth in CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338 (West 2006). Von Saher,
578 F.3d at 1031. The fact that Von Saher may still be able to bring suit under section 338 is not
relevant to this Comment.
30. 578 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2009).
31. Id. at 1029. The notion of field preemption arises from the Supremacy Clause, which
provides that "the Laws of the United States" and "all Treaties ... shall be the supreme Law of
the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § I cl. 2. Even if there is no conflicting federal law or policy, a state law may
nonetheless be preempted if it deals with an exclusive federal power. In other words, that
particular field is essentially off limits. See, e.g., Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432.
32. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1019.
33. Id. at 1027.
34. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
35. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1025-26.
36. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420 n.l 1.
37. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1025.
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the statute could not be "fairly categorized as a garden variety
property regulation" because it does not apply to "all claims of stolen
art, or even all claims of art looted in war. [Instead, t]he statute
addresses only the claims of Holocaust victims and their heirs.""
The court analogized section 354.3 to other state statutes that
had been struck down.39 The statute at issue in Garamendi, for
example, required insurance companies to disclose information about
Holocaust-era policies.4 0 The Supreme Court struck down that statute
because it interfered with the executive branch's ability to conduct
foreign affairs. 41 The Court stated in dicta that the real purpose of
that statute was to provide relief to Holocaust victims, which was not
a legitimate state responsibility.42
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that section 354.3, like the statute in
Garamendi, overstepped the boundaries of state regulatory powers
because its real purpose was to "provide relief to Holocaust victims
and their heirs." 43 The court also stated that although California's
interest in regulating the galleries and museums in California was a
legitimate one, section 354.3's language would allow suits to be
brought against any gallery or museum, regardless of its location.44
Section 354.3 therefore created "a friendly forum for litigating
Holocaust restitution claims" 45  and expressed California's
"dissatisfaction with the federal government's resolution (or lack
thereof) of restitution claims arising out of World War II."46 Because
the creation of a "world-wide forum" is not an area of traditional
state responsibility, the Ninth Circuit went on to explore whether the
statute was subject to field preemption.47
38. Id.
39. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 425-26; Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1968);
Deutsch v. Turner, 324 F.3d 692, 707 (9th Cir. 2003).
40. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420-21.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 426.
43. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1026-27.
44. Id.
45. Id
46. Id. at 1027.
47. Id.
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B. Section 354.3 Intrudes on the Federal Government's
Power to Make and Resolve War
The court considered whether section 354.3 infringed on a
power reserved to the federal government. 48 The district court held
that section 354.3 intruded on the federal government's exclusive
power to make and resolve war.49 The Ninth Circuit discussed the
war power and pointed to Deutsch v. Turner Corp.,50 which provides
that "[m]atters related to war are for the federal government alone to
address" and that any state statute that infringed on the war power
will be preempted.5
The Ninth Circuit held that section 354.3-like section 354.6 in
Deutsch--established a remedy "for wartime injuries" that created a
new cause of action for a new class of plaintiffs.52 In Deutsch, the
Ninth Circuit found section 354.6, which extended the statute of
limitations of suits involving World War II slave labor
compensation, unconstitutional because it infringed on the federal
government's power to make and resolve war." Similarly, the Von
Saher court reasoned that since section 354.3 dealt with injuries that
were inflicted during World War II, claims brought under the section
would require California courts to review restitution acts made by
foreign courts. 54 The recovery of Holocaust-era artwork affects not
only the international art market but also foreign affairs, an area
reserved for the federal government." Therefore, section 354.3 is
unconstitutional and preempted.56
C. Judge Pregerson's Dissent
Judge Pregerson did not agree with the majority's holding that
California overreached its traditional state responsibility and that
field preemption applied. Instead, he argued that California had
48. Id. at 1022.
49. Id. at 1021.
50. 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003).
51. Id. at 712.
52. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1027-28.
53. Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 712.
54. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1028.
55. Id. at 1029.
56. See id. at 1028-29.
57. Id. at 1031-32 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
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every right to regulate property located in its jurisdiction." Pregerson
thought that the majority read the statute too broadly when it held
that section 354.3 created a "world-wide forum" where anyone could
bring a suit against any museum anywhere." Instead, Pregerson
stated that a more reasonable reading of section 354.3 would
interpret it as limiting claims "to entities subject to the
jurisdiction ... of California."60 Moreover, since the section allowed
California to act within its traditional competence, the Garamendi
test should not have applied at all."1
Furthermore, Judge Pregerson stated that the majority's reliance
on Deutsch was misplaced.62 Section 354.6 allowed "recovery for
slave labor performed 'between 1929 and 1945, [under] the Nazi
regime [or] its allies and sympathizers"' 63 and was declared
unconstitutional because it was enacted 'with the aim of rectifying
wartime wrongs committed by our enemies or by parties operating
under our enemies' protection."' 64 Section 354.3 neither targeted
enemies of the United States for wartime actions nor provided for
war reparations. 5 Instead, the statute would have allowed Marie von
Saher to recover property stolen from her and in the possession of a
museum in California's jurisdiction; 6 such a right, Pregerson argued,
would not intrude on the federal government's war powers.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Garamendi Field-Preemption Test Should Not Apply
The Ninth Circuit relied on Garamendi's field-preemption
analysis in finding that the federal government's foreign affairs
powers preempted section 354.3-specifically, the power to make
58. Id. at 1032.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1031.
62. Id. at 1032.
63. Id. (quoting Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 706 (9th Cir. 2003)).
64. Id. (quoting Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 708) (emphasis omitted).
65. Id.
66. Id
67. Id.
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and resolve war." In Garamendi, the Supreme Court described the
application of the field preemption doctrine as follows:
If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of
foreign policy with no serious claim to be addressing a
traditional state responsibility, field preemption might be
the appropriate doctrine, whether the National Government
had acted and, if it had, without reference to the degree of
any conflict, the principle having been established that the
Constitution entrusts foreign policy exclusively to the
National Government.69
The Supreme Court went on to say that if a state acted within its
competence, then there would have to be a conflicting federal statute
that trumped the state's legitimate responsibility in legislating the
target issue."o
The Ninth Circuit was mistaken in applying Garamendi's field-
preemption analysis to section 354.3. First, California acted within
its competence by trying to regulate an area of traditional state
responsibility-property. The Ninth Circuit stated that section 354.3
was similar to other statutes that courts had struck down because
they "purport[ed] to regulate an area of traditional state competence"
but in reality affected foreign affairs." However, section 354.3
differs from other state statutes that courts have struck down because
of their improper effect on foreign affairs. Those cases dealt with
statutes that specifically and obviously targeted foreign countries or
foreign nationals, even though the statutes loosely dealt with areas of
traditional state responsibility. The Von Saher court compared three
such statutes to section 354.3.72
First, the court pointed to the statute at issue in Garamendi-the
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA)-which required
"insurers doing business in California to disclose information
regarding insurance policies sold, by them or related companies, in
Europe between 1920 and 1945."73 HVIRA was preempted (through
68. Id. at 1025 (majority opinion).
69. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 n.11 (2003) (citations omitted).
70. Id.
71. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1026.
72. Id.
73. Brannon P. Denning, American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi and Deutsch v. Turner
Corp., 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 950, 950 (2003).
1486
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conflict preemption, as opposed to field preemption) because it
interfered with the president's ability to handle foreign affairs.74
Second, the Ninth Circuit referenced the statute in Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council.75 That statute, the Massachusetts
Burma Law, restricted the authority of Massachusetts and its
agencies to purchase goods or services from companies that did
business with Burma (The Union of Myanmar).76 The Supreme Court
declared the statute preempted because it obstructed Congress's
ability to deal with the foreign country."
Third, the Ninth Circuit cited Zschernig v. Miller," the only case
the court used in which the Supreme Court actually applied field
preemption instead of conflict preemption.79 In Zschernig, the
Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon probate statute that, as
applied, barred heirs in certain foreign countries from inheriting
Oregon property (another typical area of state regulation).o Though
the law was drafted to apply to all nations," the Supreme Court
found that judges were implementing the statute in a way that
"regularly disfavored citizens of Communist countries."82
74. Id
75. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
76. Id. at 367.
77. Id. at 373. Congress enacted the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related
Programs Appropriations Act three months after the Massachusetts law went into effect. Id. at
368. Among other things, the Act allowed the president to impose sanctions on the government of
Myanmar directly. J. Matthew Saunders, An Iron Fist or Kid Gloves: American Insurance
Association v. Garamendi and the Fate of the Federal Monopoly on Foreign Policy, 7 CHAP. L.
REV. 279, 289 (2004).
78. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
79. The other cases the Ninth Circuit relied on deal with conflict preemption. See Am. Ins.
Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 425 (2003) ("The express federal policy and the clear conflict
raised by the state statute are alone enough to require state law to yield."); Crosby, 530 U.S. at
373 ("[W]e see the state Burma law as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's full
objectives under the federal Act."). Although the Ninth Circuit did not specifically state that it
applied conflict preemption in Deutsch, it made it clear that Deutsch involved an actual conflict in
a later case. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 561 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e emphasized in
Deutsch that 'the United States resolved the war against Germany by becoming a party to a
number of treaties and international agreements."' (citations omitted)).
80. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440-41; Curtis A. Bradley, World War II Compensation and
Foreign Relations Federalism, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 282, 286 (2002).
81. The law states in part that "[t]he right of an alien not residing within the United States or
its territories to take ... property . . . by succession or testamentary disposition" depends upon
certain factors concerning reciprocal rights. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430 n. 1.
82. Saunders, supra note 77, at 283.
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All of the cases that the Ninth Circuit cited in order to show that
section 354.3 was masquerading as a statute concerned with
traditional state responsibility are completely different from Von
Saher. Unlike the statutes in Garamendi, Deutsch, and Zschernig,
which targeted foreign countries or nationals under the pretext of
exercising traditional state power, section 354.3 focused on museums
and galleries specifically." The statute defined entities that could be
sued as "any museum or gallery that displays, exhibits, or sells any
article of historical, interpretive, scientific, or artistic significance"84
that has in its possession artwork "taken as a result of Nazi
persecution during the period of 1929 to 1945 . . . ."" The Ninth
Circuit's determination that the language of the act opened California
courts to the world by not specifically identifying California
museums and galleries is based on reasoning that is far too broad.86 A
more practical reading of the statute would show that the statute
applies to museums located solely within California's borders."
Furthermore, no person has tried to sue a gallery in a jurisdiction
outside of California under section 354.3. In fact, the defendant
museum in Von Saher is located in Pasadena, California." There is
no evidence that the statute would lead to opening a "world-wide
forum" and encroach on foreign affairs by inviting a flood of looted
artwork claims, as the Ninth Circuit majority suggests."
The Garamendi field-preemption test should only apply if
California acts outside of its traditional state responsibility."o Section
354.3 deals with the recovery of stolen property-a traditional state
area of regulation." California is not attempting to use section 354.3
to meddle in foreign affairs; therefore the Garamendi field-
preemption analysis is inapplicable.92 As Judge Pregerson suggests,
since field preemption does not apply, the only other logical choice is
83. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578 F.3d 1016, 1026 (9th Cir.
2009).
84. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3(a)(1) (West 2006).
85. Id. § 354.3(a)(2).
86. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1032 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1019 (majority opinion).
89. See id. at 1032 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
90. See supra Part III.C.
91. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1032 (Pregerson, J. dissenting).
92. Id.
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to apply conflict preemption, 93 which prescribes preemption only
where the statute directly conflicts with federal policy.94
B. The Ninth Circuit Should Have Applied the Zschernig
Direct/Indirect Field-Preemption Test
The Ninth Circuit should have applied the original Zschernig
test in order to determine whether section 354.3 was preempted
instead of relying on dicta in Garamendi.9 5 The Supreme Court stated
in Zschernig that a state statute would be field preempted if it had "a
direct impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect
the power of the central government to deal with those problems."96
Even in the absence of a treaty, a state could violate the Constitution
by "establish[ing] its own foreign policy."" For example, the
Supreme Court in Zschernig stated that the Oregon probate statute at
issue was preempted because it had "more than 'some incidental or
indirect effect in foreign countries"' and could lead to
embarrassment or disruption among foreign nations.9 8
1. Section 354.3 Does Not Directly Interfere with
Foreign Affairs, Including the Federal Government's
Power to Make and Resolve War
The Deutsch court, relying on Zschernig, created a rule for
determining when effects on foreign affairs were more than merely
incidental.99 The court suggested that any issues states dealt with that
lay in the "inner core" of foreign affairs would have more than an
incidental effect on those affairs." In Deutsch, the court stated that
the statute at issue dealt with war matters, an issue reserved for the
federal government exclusively. 10 The statute considered in
93. See sources cited supra note 26.
94. Id.
95. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 n.11 (2003).
96. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 434-35 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
99. Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 711 (9th Cir. 2003).
100. Id
101. Id at 711-12. ("Of the eleven clauses of the Constitution granting foreign affairs powers
to the President and Congress, seven concern preparing for war, declaring war, waging war, or
settling war. Most of the Constitution's express limitations on states' foreign affairs powers also
concern war. Even those foreign affairs powers in the Constitution that do not expressly concern
Summer 2010] 1489
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Deutsch-section 354.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure-
allowed any "Second World War slave labor victim,"l 02 "forced labor
victim,""o3 or heir to "bring an action to recover compensation for
labor performed ... from any entity or successor in interest thereof,
for whom that labor was performed."" The court concluded that
section 354.6 was created as a remedy for wartime acts that
California did not think the federal government had properly
resolved; therefore, it infringed on the federal government's war
powers.o5
The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Deutsch in the Von Saher
decision is misplaced. The Von Saher court declared that section
354.3 bore a fatal similarity to section 354.6 because it was created
"'with the aim of rectifying wartime wrongs committed by our
enemies or by parties operating under our enemies' protection.""o
However, section 354.3 does not deal with rectifying wartime
wrongs. Unlike the Deutsch statute, which allowed slave labor
victims or their heirs to be compensated for the unpaid labor they
performed for the Nazis or their allies during World War II,107
section 354.3 does not seek to compensate plaintiffs for injuries
caused by the Word War II Nazi Regime0 as the majority claims.
Instead, section 354.3 allows owners of artwork to reclaim what is
rightfully theirs. Although the artwork's history is traceable to its
theft during World War II, section 354.3 does not permit
compensation for the artwork's owner on the basis of the market
value of the artwork at the time of theft as section 354.6 did in
Deutsch;09 instead, recovery is limited to repossession of the artwork
itself."
war and its resolution may be understood . . . as a design to prevent war. . . .Matters related to
war are for the federal government alone to address." (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)).
102. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6(a)(1) (West 2006).
103. Id. § 354.6(a)(2).
104. Id. § 354.6(b).
105. Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 712.
106. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578 F.3d 1016, 1028 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 708).
107. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6.
108. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1028.
109. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6.
110. Id. § 354.3.
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Nor does section 354.3 target former wartime enemies, a
purpose so interconnected with war that it would definitely have
more than an incidental effect on foreign affairs."' In Deutsch,
section 354.6 allowed former slave labor victims to receive
compensation from "any entity or successor in interest thereof, for
whom that labor was performed, either directly or through a
subsidiary or affiliate."1 l2 The statute effectively continued to punish
those who collaborated with a former U.S. enemy during the war."
Section 354.3, on the other hand, does not deal with wartime
enemies. In fact, the only mention of war in section 354.3 is in the
section that identifies the "Nazi persecution" era as the relevant time
frame during which a piece of art must have been stolen to qualify
under the statute. 114 The statute does not allow Holocaust victims or
their heirs to sue people or organizations that stole the art-namely,
the Nazi regime, corporations that worked for the regime, or
successors in interest to those corporations."' Instead, the statute
allows victims or heirs to sue galleries or museums that subsequently
purchased stolen property."' A gallery or museum in California is
not a former wartime enemy of the United States.
2. Any Effect Section 354.3 Has on
Foreign Affairs Is Merely Incidental
Section 354.3 does not directly interfere with foreign affairs, and
any effect it may have on foreign affairs is merely incidental. First,
section 354.3 does not have such an effect that foreign countries are
actively complaining about the state statute as they did in Garamendi
and Crosby. In Garamendi, two countries filed amicus briefs
claiming that the HVIRA statute interfered with their dealings with
the United States."' Similarly, in Crosby, fifteen member countries
111. Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 712.
112. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6(b).
113. Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 712.
114. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3(a)(2).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (No. 02-722) (asserting that the HVIRA
statute interfered with the U.S.-German executive agreement and that the statute created tension
between the United States and Germany); Brief of Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (Nos. 02-722, 02-733) (claiming that the
HVIRA statute conflicted with "a []oint [e]ndorsement of the [i]nternational [clommission on
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in the European Union jointly filed an amicus brief because they
were concerned with the Massachusetts Burma law's effects on
relations between the United States and the European Union."'
Specifically, they alleged that "the Massachusetts Burma Law
interfere[d] with the normal conduct of EU-U.S. relations .. . [and
that] the Massachusetts Burma Law has created a significant issue in
EU-U.S. relations, including-but not limited to-raising questions
about the ability of the United States to honor international
commitments into which it has entered.""' In both Garamendi and
Crosby, the state statutes' worldwide effects were so obvious that
other countries were motivated to petition the Court to invalidate
them. No such issue exists in Von Saher.
Though the case has been before the Federal Circuit for at least
two years, no foreign country has stepped forward to express concern
that upholding section 354.3 would jeopardize its relationship with
the United States. The Von Saher majority stated that section 354.3
would make California courts review Dutch court decisions,'20 yet
the Dutch government has never confirmed this concern.
Accordingly, any effect section 354.3 could have in the Netherlands
is not significant enough to draw its government's attention.
Furthermore, section 354.3 does not risk criticizing foreign
governments or their policies. The Zschernig Court struck down the
Oregon probate statute despite the absence of any conflicting federal
law because it was concerned that Oregon was criticizing foreign
governments (namely Communist bloc countries).' 2 ' At that time, it
made sense to strike down the statute because it had "the potential to
spark an international incident."' 22 Again, no such potential exists
with section 354.3. Allowing a woman to sue a local museum to
reclaim her property does not carry the risk of sparking an incident
Holocaust Era [i]nsurance [c]laims by the Swiss and United States Governments" and that
upholding HVIRA would require Swiss companies to violate Swiss law).
118. Brief for the European Communities and Their Member States: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Crosby v.
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (No. 99-474).
119. Id. at 3.
120. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 578 F.3d 1016, 1028 (9th Cir.
2009).
121. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968); Saunders, supra note 77, at 283.
122. Saunders, supra note 77, at 283.
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between the United States and the Netherlands. In saying that section
354.3 has that power, the court is stretching the limits of the foreign
affairs doctrine to its breaking point.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the district court's holding that
section 354.3 is field-preempted by the foreign affairs doctrine-
specifically by the federal government's power to make and resolve
war.'23 In doing so, the court blocked potential owners from
reclaiming valuable property taken from them in the chaos of World
War II.
Though the federal government could eventually give those
owners of Holocaust-era artwork a way to get their property back,
the future is bleak. As J. Christian Kennedy said, there is "no specific
role for the federal government in the art restitution process" because
"museums tend to be owned and operated privately."'24 The federal
government has not historically become involved in private property
disputes, which have traditionally been an area of state
responsibility. By declaring section 354.3 unconstitutional, the Ninth
Circuit has left Holocaust-era art owners with no solution. The
federal government will not help them, and the state cannot help.
If the federal government has no specific role in the art
restitution process, then state legislatures should logically be allowed
to assume that responsibility. If Marei von Saher decides to appeal to
the U.S. Supreme Court-as she should-the Court should grant a
hearing and reverse the Ninth Circuit's holding invalidating section
354.3. If it did so, the statute could help art owners reclaim their lost
treasures from California museums and galleries. In addition, other
states may follow suit to reunite art and owner once again.
123. Von Saher, 578 F.3d 1016.
124. J Christian Kennedy, Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, Remarks at the Role of the
United States Government in Art Restitution, Potsdam, Germany (Apr. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0704/S00422.htm.
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